Wendy Marie Christensen Rawlings v. Mark Douglas Weiner : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
Wendy Marie Christensen Rawlings v. Mark
Douglas Weiner : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen W. Jewell; Attorney for Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant.
Larry E. Jones; Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen; Attorney for Defendant/Cross-Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rawlings v. Weiner, No. 860274 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/166
ITAH 






IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
vs. 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant/Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 860274-CA 
Priority No. 7 
Cross-Appeal from the First District 
Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge 
Larry E. Jones 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
175 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Cross-Respondent 
Stephen W. Jewell 3814 
First Security Bank Building 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 753-2000 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Cross-Appellant 
M DEC 28 1987 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, 
REj^ LY BRIEF OF 
CR0SS-APPELLANT 
v s . 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant/Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 860274-CA 
|.ority No. 7 Pr 
Cross-Appeal from the First District 
Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge 
Larry E. Jones 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
175 East 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Cross-Respondent 
Stephen W. Jewell 3814 
First Security Bank Building 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
Logan, Ut*h 84321 
(801) 753-2000 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Cross-Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS , 1 
ARGUMENTS 2 
I THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT MEET 
THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UTAH UCCJA IN ORDER TO RETAIN A JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE MODIFICATION PETITION 2 
II THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION CONSISTENT WITH THE UCCJA 10 
III THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE INCON-
VENIENT FORUM PROVISIONS OF THE A<pT 14 
IV THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UCCJA DO NOT 
ALLOW THAT JURISDICTION BE USED AS HARASSMENT . . 18 
CONCLUSION
 H 22 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Hepner v. Hepner, 469 N.E.2d 780 
(Ind.App. 3 Dist. 1984) 13 
Hogge v. Hogge, 694 P. 2d 51 (Utah 1982) 19 
Kramer v. Kramer, 57 Utah Adv.Rep. 14 
(May 15, 1987) - 19 
Miller v. Miller, 463 So.2d 939 
(La.App. 2 Cir. 1985) 17 
Szmyd v. Szmyd, Alaska, 641 P. 2d 14 (1982) 4, 15 
William L. v. Michelle P., 99 Misc.2d 346, 
416 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Fam.Ct. 1979) 16 
-ii-
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
U.C.A. 78-45c-i . . . . . 1,8,18 
U.C.A. 78-45c-3 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 23 
U.C.A. 78-45c-7 14,23 
U.C.A. 78-45c-14 11 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITIED 
Ratner, Procedural Due Process and 
Jurisdiction to Adjudication 21, 22 
Commissioners' Notes on Section 14 9 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN * 





MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, Case No. 860274-CA 
» 
Defendant/Cross-Respondent. 
Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, Wendy Marie Christensen 
Rawlings, by and through counsel, offers the following in 
reply to the Brief of Cross-Respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Even though the Box Elder District Court is the court 
of original jurisdiction, the jurisdictional requirements as 
stated in UCA 78-45c-3 must still be met in order for the 
court to modify a divorce decree as to custody and visitation 
matters. Those requirements are not met in this* action for 
the Court to consider a modification of the Decree and the 
District Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction. 
2. The District Court did not properly consider the 
jurisdictional matters presented to it nor was the District 
Court's exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the Utah 
UCCJA. 
3. Even if it were considered that the District Court 
did have jurisdiction, the District Court did not properly 
consider the convenient forum issues to determine if Utah 
should exercise jurisdiction and the District Court abused its 
discretion in retaining jurisdiction* 
4. Even if it were determined that the District Court 
had jurisdiction, and at the time properly exercised its 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction should be transferred to Washington 
pursuant to the Utah UCCJA due to the retirement of Judge Call 
and Cross-Respondent's continued harassment through ongoing 
litigation and custody disputes. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT DOES HOT MEET 
THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UTAH UCCJA IN ORDER TO RETAIN A JURIS-
DICTION OVER THE MODIFICATION PETITION. 
Although the Cross-Appellant may have indicated in her 
original Brief that Utah may have jurisdiction because it is 
the decree state, any such recognition is a misstatement and 
Cross-Appellant strongly argues that the Box Elder District 
Court, at the time of the Hearing on Cross-Respondent's Order 
to Show Cause, did not have jurisdiction to hear any issues 
relevant to custody and visitation as contemplated in the Utah 
UCCJA. 
Cross-Appellant fully recognizes that the Uniform Act 
prefers the jurisdiction of the decree state over another 
state in considering modification of custody decrees. 
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However, it should be further noted that the Act contemplates 
and requires a continued and ongoing jurisdictional review as 
matters are brought before the courts regarding modification 
of decrees. So far, none of the cases cited in either Cross-
Appellant's Brief or Respondent's Brief are exactly on point 
with the instant action. Each of the cases deals with either 
determining jurisdiction in an original decree, or with the 
more common situation where one party has moved from the 
decree state and requests the new home state, the non-decree 
state, to modify the custody or visitation provisions of the 
decree state. 
In the instant action, the custodial parent has moved 
from Utah, the decree state, to Washington, the non-decree 
state. Approximately eighteen (IS) months later the non-
custodial parent (Cross-Respondent Mark Weiner) filed an Order 
to Show Cause which included request for the Court to grant 
him full custody of the parties' five children. The Order to 
Show Cause was served on the custodial parent, Wendy Rawlings, 
in Washington. In other words, the non-custodial parent 
residing in the decree state is requesting the decree state to 
modify the decree and is requiring the custodial parent to 
return to the decree state to defend and respond to any such 
action. 
As stated earlier, although the decree state is given 
preference, that preference is not absolute, and the decree 
state must still comply with the jurisdictional requirements 
of the UCCJA in order to modify the Decree. 
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A closely similar factual case is SZMYD v. SZMYD, Alaska, 
641 P. 2d 14 (1982). In that case, the parties were divorced 
in Alaska in October of 1977 and the wife was granted custody 
of the couple's one-year-old child. A yea]? later, in the fall 
of 1978, the wife and child moved to Washington State. They 
resided in Washington for two years and then moved to 
California in early September, 1980. On December 5, 1980, the 
husband fxled a motion in Alaska, the decree state, to modify 
the custody decree. The wife moved to dismiss the action for 
lack of jurisdiction, or alternatively, on the grounds that 
Alaska was an inconvenient forum, which motion the Superior 
Court denied. The wife sought a review of that denial to the 
Alaska Supreme Court which stayed the Superior Court 
proceedings in order to hear her petition. 
In reaching the first xssue, whether the Alaska trial 
court had jurisdiction to hear the modification petition, the 
Alaska Supreme Court ruled that even though the trial court 
had the continuing right to modify custody decrees, the trial 
court must always determine whether jurisdiction exists in 
order to modify a decree (641 P.2d at 17). The Court 
explained its ruling in the footnotes (No. 7) and stated: 
This view is consistent with the uniform act. See 
RATNER, supra note 2, at 395: 
"Section 14(a) apparently narrows the scope of 
significant-connection, substantial-evidence, best-
interest jurisdiction by confining modification 
jurisdiction to the initial-decree state if it meets 
the prerequisites of the Act." (emphasis in 
original). 
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In our view, the UCCJA intended that continuing 
jurisdiction in the original state must rest on some 
significant connection with a party. See Commissioners' 
Note to UCCJA Section 14. This is frequently easy to 
satisfy due to the "significant connection" basis for 
jurisdiction found in Section 3(a)(2) of the UCCJA. See 
note 8, infra. Alaska's version omits that basis and 
thus even further narrows both initial and continuing 
jurisdiction. 
This view is also consistent with the language of 
Section 14 of the UCCJA. That provision prohibits a non-
decree state from exercising modification jurisdiction 
unless "the court which rendered the decree does not now 
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with this Act. . . . " (emphasis 
added). [Statutory citation omitted!. That modification 
jurisdiction cannot be exercised absent compliance with 
the jurisictional prerequisites of Section 3 [Statutory 
citation omitted]. It is also consistent with the 
uniform act's underlying purpose that the appropriate 
forum make custodial determinations, assuming that the 
"appropriate forum" is substantially defined by which 
state meets the jurisdictional prerequisites. 
Our approach is further consistent with the late 
Professor Bodenheimer's view that the act was intended 
"to strengthen the continuing jurisdiction of the state 
of the initial decree...." Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 
214. Reading the provisions together, once there is a 
decree, one must look first to the issuing state to see 
if it continues to have modification jurisdiction, i.e., 
does it still satisfy the act's jurisdictional 
prerequisites? UCCJA Section 14. If it does, the decree-
state has jurisdiction, perhaps exclusively unless it 
chooses to decline it on inconvenient forum grounds. See 
Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 216-19, 222-24. (641 P. 2d 
17). 
As stated in the above-citation, Alaska does not include 
in its jurisdictional requirements the significant-connection 
test included in Utah's UCCJA, Section 78-45c-3(b), which 
states as one basis that Utah may assume jurisdiction if: 
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a 
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the 
child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection with this 
state, and (ii) there is available in this state 
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substantial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
In determining if the Alaska Superior Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3 of the Act (less the 
equivalent of Utah's subsection <l)(b) thereof) the Supreme 
Court of Alaska held that since the wife had recently moved 
from the State of Washington and was currently residing in 
California, and since California was not the "home state," the 
child not having resided in California for six months, no 
other state had jurisdiction at the relevant time. The Alaska 
Supreme Court seems to have reluctantly held that the trial 
court had jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection <a)<4) of 
Section 3 of the Act (LLC.A. 78-45c-3<1)<d)) because no other 
state appeared to have jurisdiction. It can be easily read 
into the holding as dictum, that if the wife had either 
continued to reside in Washington where she had resided for 
two years, or if she had resided in California for more than 
six months at the time the petition to modify was filed in 
Alaska, thus allowing another state to satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirements as the "home state," the Alaska 
Supreme Court would have held that the trial court simply did 
not have jurisdiction. The Court did, however, conclude that 
Alaska was an inconvenient forum and directed the trial court 
to dismiss the petition to modify. A review of the 
inconvenient forum provisions will be discussed later in this 
brief. 
6 
In reviewing whether the District Court in the instant 
action had jurisdiction, the Court must review Section 3 of 
the UCCJA. The jurisdictional requirements are stated as 
follows: 
78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in the State* <1> A 
court of this state which is competent to decide child 
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody 
determination by initial or modification decree if the 
conditions as set forth in any of the following 
paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state <i> is the home state of the child 
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) 
had been the child's home state within six months before 
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent 
from this state because of his removal or retention by a 
person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a 
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in 
this state? 
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a 
court of this state assume jurisdiction because <i) the 
child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection with this 
state, and <ii) there is available in this state 
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
<c) The child is physically present in this state 
and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he 
has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or 
abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent; or 
<d) <i> It appears that no other state would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with paragraphs (a), <b) or <c), or another 
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground 
that this state is the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the 
best interest of the child that this court assume 
jurisdiction* 
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of 
subsection (1), physical presence in this state of the 
child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not 
alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of 
this state to make a child custody determination, 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while 
desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to 
determine his custody. 
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It is clear from the facts that the only possible basis 
for jurisdiction in Utah in the instant action would be 
Section 78-45c-3<1)(b). Utah is not the children's home state 
(78-45c-3(a))? the children are not physically present in the 
state and there is no claim for emergency jurisdiction (78-45c-
3(1)(c); and Washington would have jurisdiction under the 
prerequisites of the act since it is the home state and the 
children physically reside in Washington (78-45c-3(1)(d). 
Therefore, for Utah to have jurisidiction, the requirements of 
78-45c-3(1)(b) must be met, and there must be a finding of 
"significant connections" and "substantial evidence.w 
While it is conceded that Mark Weiner continues to reside 
in Utah, it is strongly argued that the children no longer 
have significant connections with the State of Utah, having, 
at the time the Order to Show Cause was served, not resided in 
Utah for eighteen months and having currently not resided in 
Utah for almost three and one-half years* There is no 
"substantial evidence" concerning the children's present or 
future care, protection, training and personal relationships 
in Utah and it is not in the best interest of the children for 
Utah to assume jurisdiction. 
The significant connection and substantial evidence 
requirements must further be considered in liqht of the stated 
purposes of the Act, one of which is included in Section 78-
45c-l(c), which states: 
8 
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody 
of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which 
the child and his family have the CLOSEST CONNECTION and 
where SIGNIFICANT evidence concerning his care, 
protection, training and personal relationships is MOST 
READILY AVAILABLE, and that courts of this state decline 
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his 
family have a CLOSER CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER STATE; 
(emphais added) 
Many of the cases cited in Cross-Appt?llant' s Brief 
further stress that the courts must consider which state has 
the closest connection and in which stat^ the most significant 
evidence is most readily available. That was not done by the 
District Court in the case at bar. 
Also, as pointed out in Cross-Respondent's Brief, the 
original drafters of the Act at least considered the 
possibility of a situation similar to the instant action. In 
the Commissioners' Notes on Section 14 (which section deals 
with modification provisions) the Reportepr states: 
The fact that the court had previously considered 
the case may be one factor favoring its continued 
jurisdiction. If, however, all of the persons involved 
have moved away, or the contact with the state has 
otherwise become slight, modification jurisdiction should 
shift elsewhere. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant action, since the children no longer have 
the most significant connection with Utah and substantial 
evidence concerning their future care, etc. cannot be found in 
Utah, the provisions of 78-45c-3(1)<b) ar^ not satisfied. 
Furthermore, since no other jurisdictional requirements are 
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met under Section 3, the District Court did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the matter of Cross-Respondent's 
request for change of custody. The rulings of the District 
Court to the contrary should be reversed and the Order to Show 
Cause requesting a change of custody should be dismissed. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION CONSISTENT WITH THE UCCJA. 
Cross-Appellant readily recognizes that prior to her 
moving to Washington in June of 1984, the District Court had 
heard many matters relative to visitation. As indicated in 
Cross-Appellant's previous brief and in the recitation of 
facts in Cross-Respondent's brief, there had been almost a 
dozen orders to show cause issued or heard in the slightly 
more than two and one-half years from the time of the divorce 
until Cross-Appellant moved. Thereafter, the Court modified 
the decree regarding visitation, which was consented to by 
Cross-Appellant and was necessary due to the distance 
involved. That was scheduled on or about October 23, 1984, 
approximately four months after Cross-App€?llant moved to 
Washington. 
Although the Court issued an order directing the clerk to 
withhold child support payments pending receipt of an address 
and phone number from Wendy Rawlings, at no time was Wendy 
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Rawlings' counsel given notice of any sucjh motion nor did the 
District Court afford Wendy Rawlings an opportunity of a 
hearing to determine the facts alleged by Mark Weiner. When 
Wendy Rawlings* counsel became aware of the order and 
contacted the Court, the matter was clarified. 
Cross-Respondent's Order to Show Cause was issued on or 
about October 23, 1985, but not served on Wendy Rawlings until 
on or about December 3, 1985. 
Since the Washington Court had initially exercised 
emergency jurisdiction to hear some matters regarding 
visitation in Washington, the Washington Court recognized that 
the jurisdictional question would need to be ultimately 
resolved and informed Cross-Appellant's Washington counsel 
that it would contact the Utah Court to discuss the matter. 
Pursuant to Section 14 of the UCCJA, the Washington Court 
properly recognized that it should defer ^jurisdiction to Utah 
unless Utah declined to exercise jurisdiction. In contacting 
Judge Call, Commissioner Gaddis of the Washington Court was 
informed that Judge Call desired to retail jurisdiction and 
thus, Washington elected to defer jurisdiction. Commissioner 
Gaddis stated in his January 13, 1986 Ord^r Declining 
Jurisdiction that "Upon communication witty said Court it Cthe 
Utah Court] has elected and determined to continue exercising 
sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction.w (See Addendum 
to Cross-Appellant's Brief.) 
11 
Unfortunately, the Utah Court interpreted the discussion 
between the two judges somewhat differently than the 
Washington Court. In his Statement and Order dated December 
23, 1985, a copy o± which is attached to Brief of Cross-
Appellant at Page Al, Judge Call stated "... Commissioner 
Gaddis of said Washington Court contacted this court declining 
to accept jurisdiction, noted the problems the minor children 
were having because of the visitation fights, and urged this 
court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing, 
adjusting or modifying the custody and visitation orders*" 
In Judge Call's subsequent Memorandum, dated February 26, 
1986, in response to Wendy Rawlings' request to partially set 
aside Judge Christoffersen's Memorandum Decision of December 
23, 1985, refusing to transfer jurisdiction allegedly because 
Washington had declined to take jurisdiction. Judge Call 
simply stated that the Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Christoffersen appeared to be "Accurately based on the 
Washington Court's conclusion that Utah was the proper 
forum.n At no time has Judge Call issued any findings of fact 
or conclusions of law or otherwise clarified his ruling or 
even given any basis for his decision to retain jurisdiction* 
Cross-Appellant's Washington attorney has requested further 
clarification from Commissioner Gaddis, which clarification 
will be provided to this Court when received. Cross-Appellant 
argues that the District Court failed to adequately consider 
the provisions of the Utah UCCJA and that the court's exercise 
of jurisdiction was not consistent with the Utah UCCJA. 
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In HEPNER v. HEFNER, 469 N.E.2d 780 (Ind.App. 3 Dist. 
1984), the Indiana Appeals Court ruled that the Indiana trial 
court lacked the power to assume jurisdiction over a 
modification petition because the trial court failed to 
seriously address the issue of its jurisdiction under the 
UCCJA. In that case, the parties were divorced in Indiana 
some time prior to 1983* Over the next several years 
following the divorce, petitions and cross-petitions were 
filed alleging various contemptuous acts regarding visitation 
and support. The wife and child subsequently moved from 
Indiana to Illinois and had resided in Illinois for over six 
months when the wife petitioned the Indiana court to terminate 
the husband's visitation. When that order was denied in 
Indiana, the wife filed a similar motion in Illinois, 
whereafter the husband filed a petition in Indiana requesting 
that the wife be again held in contempt of court. 
Although there is extensive reference to the record and 
the trial court's discussion with the wife's attorney 
regarding the provisions of the UCCJA, indicating that the 
court was attempting to base its decision claiming 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Act, the Indiana Appeals Court 
ruled that the trial court had not properly considered the 
issue of jurisdiction, both as to simultaneous proceedings and 
as to inconvenient forum consideration. jThe Appeals Court 
stated: 
The [trial court! clearly failed to follow the Act. 
It was correct in its statements concerning the purpose 
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of the UCCJL. However, we would refer the court to other 
policies behind the act which are to: Eavoid 
jurisdictional competition, promote cooperation with the 
courts of other states, assure that litigation concerning 
the custody of a child take place in the state with the 
closest connection and most significant evidence and to 
decline jurisdiction when a child and his family have a 
closer connection with another state, and to promote and 
expand the exchange of information and other forms of 
mutual assistance between the courts.JH 
The District Court in the instant action also failed to 
follow the Act and further failed to even consider the 
purposes or provisions of the Act by nerver giving any 
statements, reasons, or hints why the Corut ruled that it had 
jurisdiciton. 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-
TION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE INCON-
VENIENT FORUM PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. 
Another factor which needs to be pointed out in showing 
that the trial court was not exercising jurisdiction 
consistent with the Act is the court's failure to address or 
even consider the inconvenient forum issues as required in UCA 
78-45c-7, which states in relevant to part: 
<i) A court which has jurisdiction under this act 
to make an initial or modification decree may decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree 
if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a 
custody determination under the circumstances of the case 
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate 
forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made 
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a party or 
a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, 
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the 
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it may take into account the following factors, 
among others: 
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's 
home state; 
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(b) If another state has a clqser connection with 
the child and his family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
<c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's 
present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships is more readily available in 
another state; 
<d) If the parties have agreed on another forum 
which is no less appropriate; 
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of 
this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in 
section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before determining whether to decline or retain 
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of 
another state and exchange information pertinent to the 
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to 
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more 
appropriate court and that a forum will be available to 
the parites. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient 
forum and that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it 
may stay the proceedings upon condition that a custody 
proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state 
or upon any other conditions which may be just and 
proper, including the condition that a moving party 
stipulate his consent and submission to the jurisdiction 
of the other forum. 
As indicated earlier, the Alaska Supreme Court in SZMYD, 
supra, looked very closely at the inconvenient forum issues in 
determining whether Alaska should exercise its jurisdiction. 
The Alaska court noted that the purpose ojf the inconvenient 
forum provisions were to, "Encourage jurisdictional restraint 
whenever another state appears to be in a better position to 
determine custody of a child." Commissioners' Note to UCCJA 
Section 7." 641 P.2d at 19. The Alaska Supreme Court had 
remanded the case to the trial court for a statement of 
reasons why the trial court had not granted the motion since 
it was difficult to determine where there *iad been an abuse of 
discretion without such reasons. 
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After remand, the trial court provided the following 
reasons: 
1. The State of Washington, which was the child's 
prior home state, was not a convenient forum since none 
of the parties at the time of the initiation for this 
request for custody modification lived in Washington. 
The mother and child living in California for only a 
short time and the father having his residence in the 
State of Alaska. California was not the home state of 
the child. 
2. The child was born in the State of Alaska and 
lived in Alaska for almost three years. The child has 
had more contact with the State of Alaska than 
California. 
3. The father has; had more contact with Alaska than 
the mother has had with California. 
4. More people involved with the child were from 
the State of Alaska than the State of California. 
5. Substantially, the relations on both the 
father's and the mother's side were living in Alaska in 
the Fairbanks area at the time of the request for custody 
modification. The only people involved in California 
were the mother and child. 
6. The objection by the mother as to the cost is 
not a factor since the father is required to pay the cost 
of transportation as well as arrangements for the mother 
while in Alaska." 641 P.2d at 19-20. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska then indicated that other 
jurisdictions, on substantially similar facts, had stayed or 
dismissed proceedings in favor of a more appropriate forum. 
The court noted that the underlying theme in those decisions 
was the focus on the child's situation and connections with a 
particular forum; that is, which forum is best in light of the 
child's best interest? The court then analyzed the decision 
of WILLIAM L. v. MICHELLE P., 99 Misc.2d 346, 416 N.Y.S.2d 477 
(Fam.Ct. 1979), where a New York court concluded that New York 
should not exercise its jurisdiction even though the decree 
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had been entered in New York, because th^ children and mother 
had not been in New York for approximately four years. 
The Alaska Supreme Court then reviewed the facts relevant 
to its case, including home state, closer connections, source 
of evidence, relative hardship, and contravention of UCCJA 
purposes, and held that it was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion not to decline to exercise jurisdiction. The 
Alaska Supreme Court held that Californiaj was the more 
appropriate forum in light of the child's best interest, even 
though the child had only resided in California, at the time 
of the hearings, for approximtely six months. 
Likewise, the Louisiana Appellate Court in MILLER v. 
MILLER, 463 So.2d 939 (La.App. 2 Cir. 198^) held that 
Louisiana was not the appropriate forum since Louisiana had 
not been the child's home state for over four years and in 
spite of the fact that the child had visited in Louisiana with 
his father on numerous occasions. In that case, the parties 
were divorced in Florida after which the father moved to 
Louisiana. The mother then moved with th^ child to 
Massachusetts. The father thereafter sought to modify the 
Florida decree in Louisiana. The Appeals Court held that even 
though Florida was no longer the child's home state, Louisiana 
was not the most appropriate forum to determine custody 
matters since the child had closer and more recent significant 
connections with Florida. The court also held that the trial 
court had failed to make the statutory inquiries regarding the 
jurisdictional questions and further addec|: 
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The applicant [the custodial mother] should not be 
required to defend modification of the Florida custody 
decree in a state which had not been the child's home 
state in over four years. Ms. Miller had the right or 
privilege under the forwarded decree to move herself and 
the child to Massachusetts. Ms. Miller should not be 
required to litigate in Louisiana simply because Florida 
no longer may be the home state. 
In the instant action, Cross-Appellant has cited numerous 
specific reasons why Washington is the most convenient forum 
to determine issues regarding custody and visitation of the 
children (See Brief of Cross-Appellant, Argument II, Page 26-
31). In addition, Mark Weiner has had counsel appear in his 
behalf at Washington proceedings. He travels to Washington 
numerous times during the year for visitation (for which the 
court has allowed travel expenses) and has had frequent 
contact with school teachers and officials, church and other 
acquaintances in the Seattle area. In contrast, Wendy 
Rawlings is in Utah perhaps one or two times a year. The 
trial court's failure to even consider those matters, let 
alone issue findings of fact relative to such issues, is an 
obvious abuse of discretion and a failure by the court to 
exercise jurisdiction consistent with the purposes and intent 
of the Utah UCCJA. 
IV. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH UCCJA DO NOT 
ALLOW THAT JURISDICTION BE USED AS HARASSMENT 
As stated in UCA Section 78-45c-l(d), one of the purposes 
of the UCCJA is to "discourage continuing controversies over 
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child custody in the interest of greater stability of home 
environment and of secure family relationships with the 
child. This has been emphasized in the most recent opinions 
of our Supreme Court dealing with petitions to modify divorce 
decrees to change custody, from HOGGE v. HOGGE, 694 P. 2d 51 
(Utah 1982) through KRAMER v KRAMER, 57 Utah Adv.Rep. 14 (May 
15, 1987). Pursuant to what has now becqme the majority 
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in determining modification 
child custody orders, the trial court must first make the 
threshhold determination whether there has been a significant 
change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the reopening of 
the custody decree, or as stated in KRAMER, supra: 
"The change in circumstances threshhold is high to 
discourage frequent petitions for modification of custody 
decrees. The test was designed to 'protect the custodial 
parent from harassment by repeated litigation,' and to 
protect the child from 'ping-pong custody wars. / w (See 
HOGGE v HOGGE, 694 P.2D 51, 53, 54 (Utah 1982). 
The Court further stated: 
"The essential premise of our rtcent child custody 
cases is the view that stable custody arrangements are of 
critical importance to the child's proper development 
[citations omitted]. The two part HOGGE test is founded 
upon that premise. No matter how well intentioned, 
changes in custody could do more harm than good 
[citations omitted]. For this reason when a trial court 
is asked to determine whether there has been a change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant Reopening a custody 
decree, ordinarily it must focus exclusively on the 
parenting ability of the custodial parent and the 
functioning of the established custodial relationships." 
57 UAR at 15. 
In order for the trial court to be consistent with the 
rulings from our Supreme Court dealing with petitions to 
19 
change custody, it is essential that the court first determine 
if there has been the necessary change in circumstances by 
receiving testimony dealing with the parenting ability of the 
custodial parent and the functioning of the established 
custodial relationship. That can only be accomplished where 
there is evidence available to provide such testimony. That 
testimony cannot be provided to the court when the custodial 
parent and the children have not resided in the state for a 
significant period of time, such as in the instant action. 
At the hearing on Defendant's request for change of 
custody, Defendant called six witnesses, Wendy Rawlings, 
himself, Nels Sather, Charles Burbank, Dr. Kim Qpenshaw, and 
Dr. Jack M. Reiter. Other than the parties to this action, 
only Dr. Reiter had had any substantial contact with Plaintiff 
or the children in excess of two years. Furthermore, Dr. 
Reiter was a psychiatrist residing in Seattle, Washington and 
appointed by the Washington Court to do home study-
psychological evaluation, and was familiar to the Washington 
Court. In other words. Defendant brought his primary witness 
from Washington to a hearing in Utah. 
Plaintiff was only able to have herself, her husband, and 
her parents, Wendell and Rosalee Christensen, testify on her 
behalf. Plaintiff was not able to afford the expense of 
bringing other therapists, counselors, school and church 
officials, and other people to testify. 
The same will be true for any future hearings. The 
District Court is simply unable to make the kinds of 
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determinations as is required by the Utah Supreme Court and in 
compliance with the Utah UCCJA. 
Furthermorer as noted earlier, Defendant has filed 
numerous orders to show cause requiring Plaintiff to appear in 
court. After Defendant originally filed the appeal in this 
action, Defendant again filed a Petition to Modify the decree 
requesting custody, which Petition has been stayed pursuant to 
court order at Plaintiff's request pending an outcome of this 
appeal* In other words, if this Court were to uphold the 
District Court's decision regarding jurisdiction, Plaintiff 
will again be forced to defend herself ih the District Court 
regarding the petition for change of custody, which is an 
absolute contravention of the purposes of the Utah UCCJA. 
As stated in RATNER, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND 
JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATION (a) Effeciive-Litigation Values 
vs. The Territorial Imperative; (b) The Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, 75 N.W.U.L.Rev. 363, 398-99 (1980), the 
optimum-evidence home-state [Washington] need not be 
subordinated to the decree-state CUtah3 jurisdiction in all 
situations. "Only when concealment of trie child prevents 
enforcement by the winner within six months should anti-
harassment require the apparent home state to yield 
modification jurisdiction to another forum.n Ratner also 
indicates that removal, retention, and deprival of visitation 
rights can be inhibited through the enforcement of the Act in 
the home-state without the subordination of the home-state 
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jurisdiction by a blanket preference to the decree-state that 
impairs the access to evidence and the anti-harassment 
purposes of the Act. (See RATNER, supra, 398) 
It should also be further noted that Judge Call, since 
the hearing on this action, has retired from the bench. 
Therefore, any claims that the District Court had made prior 
rulings and was therefore familiar with the action, although 
never specifically stated by the court, no longer have any 
force and effect and are completely moot. A new judge in Utah 
would have no better insight or ability to decide visitation 
and custody matters than would a Washington judge. However, 
since the children reside in Washington, since the most 
significant and closest connections with the children are in 
Washington, and since the most substantial evidence concerning 
the children's current and future welfare is found in 
Washington, Washington is in a much better position than is a 
Utah court to make any determinations regarding any such 
modifications. Therfore, this matter should be transferred to 
the Washington court for further consideration of any custody 
or visitation matters. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for the District Court to have heard any action 
regarding custody and visitation, it was incumbent upon the 
court to make a determination whether it was vested with 
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jurisdiction. Although the District Court felt that it had 
jurisdiction, at no time was any reason given for such a 
ruling or any findings of fact or conclusions of law issued by 
the court. Even had there been such, it is clear pursuant to 
UCA 73-45c-3 that the District Court did not have jurisdiction 
to hear the action. 
Even if it were held that the District Court did have 
jurisdiction, it is abundantly clear that it should not have 
exercised any such jurisdiction but should have deferred to 
the jurisdiction of the Washington pursuant to UCA 78-45c-7 
since all of the factors indicated therein for determining the 
most convenient forum clearly favored the Washington court. 
None of the factors favor the Utah Court. 
Finally, even if this court had jurisdiction at such time 
and had been the most convenient forum, since the trial judge 
has retired from the bench, and since Defendant/Cross-
Respondent has indicated that he will continue to pursue his 
quest to obtain custody of the children at all costs, 
including the children's well being, it is incumbent upon this 
court to transfer jurisdiction of custody and visitation 
matters in this action to the Washington court in accordance 
with the purposes and provisions of the Utah UCCJA. 
Therefore, this court should reverse the ruling of the 
District Court regarding jurisdiction and/or transfer 
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jurisdiction of custody and visitation matters to the 
Washington court. 
DATED this _(£_ day oi December, 1987. 
-£-
lintiff/Cross-
?llant Wendy Rawlings 
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